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WORKERS' COMPENSATION: WAGE EFFECTS, BENEFIT
INADEQUACIES, AND THE VALUE OF HEALTH LOSSES
W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore*
Abstract-Using the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey in
conjunction with BLS risk series and state workers' compensation benefit formulas, the authors assess the labor market
implications of workers' compensation. Higher levels of
workers' compensation benefits reduce wage levels, and controlling for workers' compensation raises estimates of compensating differentials for risk. The rate of trade-off between
wages and workers' compensation suggests that benefit levels
provide suboptimal levels of income insurance, abstracting
from moral hazard considerations. The value of nonmonetary
losses from job injuries (including pain and suffering and
nonwork disability) is estimated to be $17,00-$26,00.

and the effect of the accident on the marginal
utility of consumption.
One could omit workers' compensation from
wage equations if there were uniformity in the
benefit levels. There are, however, substantial variations both by state and according to the worker's
wage level. For example, the usual formula for
temporary and permanent total disabilities provides for two-thirds wage replacement with a benefit cap, so that lower paid workers effectively
receive more benefits. The principal state differences are with respect to features such as benI. Introduction
efit caps, benefit floors, and time limits for benefit
A LTHOUGH there has been a decade of payment.
literature on empirical estimates of comIn view of this variation, one would expect the
pensating differentials for job hazards,' it is only level of workers' compensation to play an imrecently that analysts have begun to focus on the portant role in analyses of the compensation
role of the workers' compensation system in affect- package. Although research results to date are
ing these differentials.2 From a conceptual stand- somewhat mixed, they suggest evidence of two
point one would expect workers' compensation to types of influences. First, workers are willing to
play a significant role since the employer can trade off additional wage compensation for higher
compensate workers for job risks either through workers' compensation benefits. Second, inclusion
ex ante compensation (compensating wage dif- of a workers' compensation variable raises estiferentials) or ex post compensation (such as mates of the trade-off between wages and job
workers' compensation benefits). The relative im- risks.
portance of the two forms of compensation deThus far there has been no link between empends on the degree to which workers wish to pirical issues of this type and the more policy-oriinsure the income risks of job injury-a value that ented themes in the workers' compensation literahinges on factors such as the degree of wage loss ture. A continuing perceived need that has been in
the forefront of job safety policy since The Report
of the National Commission on State Workniens'
Received for publication July 15, 1985. Revision accepted for
publication May 23, 1986.
Compensation Laws (1972) has been determination
* Northwestern University and Duke University, respectively.
the adequacy of existing workers' compensation
of
Helpful comments and data were received from John F.
Burton, Jr., John Worrall, Alan Krueger, and seminar par- benefit levels.3 Nominal workers' compensation
ticipants at several universities. The University of Chicago
earnings replacement rates have traditionally been
Center for the Study of the Economy and the State and the
below
1.0 except for very low income workers
Duke University Fuqua School of Business provided partial
whose wages are exceeded by a benefits floor.
research support.
l See, for example, the studies by Brown (1980), Duncan and
(Replacement rates taking into account the benHlolmlund (1983), Olson (1981), Smith (1976), Thaler and
efits' favorable tax status are higher.) Whether
Rosen (1976), and Viscusi (1978, 1983). Also see the reviews by
compensation is optimal is, however, more
partial
Bailey (1980), Rosen (1985), Smith (1979), and Viscusi (1983).
The literature began with Adam Smith (1776).
difficult to ascertain. If a job injury lowers the

tX

2 Recent empirical work includes studies by Arnould and
Nichols (1983), Butler (1983), and Dorsey and Walzer (1983).
Also see the broader perspectives by Chelius (1977), DarlingHammond and Kniesner (1980), Ehrenberg (1985), and Oi
(1973) as well as the volumes edited by Worrall (1983) and by
Worrall and Appel (1985).
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3This theme of inadequate benefits has continued to be
emphasized in the more recent work by the former Chairman
of the National Commission on State Workmens' Compensation Laws, John Burton. See particularly Burton (1978).
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worker's marginal utility of consumption for any
given consumption level, as is often assumed in
the health literature, then less than full compensation is desirable.4 A worker would not choose to
equalize income levels in the healthy and injured
states if the injury impaired his ability to derive
utility from the expenditures. How far below 1.0
the optimal replacement rate should be and
whether current replacement rates are optimal remain open issues.
Obtaining a general sense of whether workers'
compensation benefits are adequate is particularly
important since this wage benefit component is
not the result of a voluntary market transaction.
States set the benefit floors for different classes of
injury so that it is not possible to infer that actual
benefits are necessarily efficient. Firms cannot reduce the benefit levels, and the transactions costs
involved in setting up a separate program to augment existing benefit levels may discourage efforts
to overcome the shortcomings that arise from inadequate benefits.
The purposes of this paper are threefold. First,
the theoretical framework we develop enables us
to assess the economic implications of the trade-off
between wages and workers' compensation. We
explore this trade-off using data from the 1977
Quality of Employment Survey coupled with information on industry risk levels and state workers'
compensation benefits. Second, we refine the empirical estimates of the effect of workers' compensation on wage levels and on compensating
differentials for job risks. Our analysis differs from
previous studies in that the workers' compensation
variable is worker-specific rather than a state benefit average, and it incorporates the favorable tax
status afforded benefits. In addition, the diversity
of the risk measures and the set of other nonpecuniary characteristics included is broader than
in earlier studies. In particular, we include an
individual-specific measure of job hazards in a
number of our estimated equations.
As a final product of this research we generate
the first implicit values of the nonpecuniary aspects
of job injuries that have ever been obtained. This
general area of concern, often referred to as the
cost of pain and suffering and nonwork disability,
has thus far not been amenable to estimation.

4 See Viscusi (1979, 1980).

We develop the theoretical framework for the
subsequent analysis in section II. Section III provides an overview of the data and the empirical
framework, which can be viewed as a straightforward extension of the compensating differential
approach. In section IV we report our empirical
results and explore their implications.
II.

Conceptual Framework

The focus of the empirical analysis is on the
trade-off between wages and workers' compensation in the total compensation package for
hazardous jobs. For much the same reason that we
observe positive compensating wage differentials
for job risks and other unpleasant job attributes,
we should observe negative wage differentials for
beneficial aspects of the overall compensation
package, such as workers' compensation. The purpose of this section is not to reiterate this basic
result, which is a direct generalization of the work
of Adam Smith, but rather to investigate the properties of the trade-off between wages and workers'
compensation. In particular, what is the efficient
rate of substitution between these two compensation components? The expression we derive for
this trade-off provides the benchmark in the subsequent empirical work for ascertaining whether
workers' compensation levels are appropriate.
The formulation of the model, which entails
very few restrictive assumptions, parallels the
health state utility function approach of Viscusi
(1978). Suppose that there are two possible health
states. In state 1 the worker is healthy and experiences utility U1(x) from any given consumption
level x. In state 2 the worker experiences a job
injury and has utility U2(x). For any given level
of consumption, the worker would rather be
healthy than not (U1(x) > U2(x) > 0), has a
greater marginal utility of consumption when
healthy than when injured (Uxl(x) > Ux2(x) > 0),
and has a diminishing marginal utility of con-

sumption(Uxx,U2

< 0).

Let p denote the risk of an on-the-job injury,
that is, the probability that state 2 prevails. Similarly, 1 - p is the probability that the worker
remains healthy. Let w1 be the wage the worker is
paid when he is healthy and w2 be the level of
workers' compensation when the worker is injured. For simplicity all other income the worker
receives when injured, such as social security ben-

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
efits, is subsumed into the functional form of
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If the job risk p equals zero then dwl/dw2 also
equals zero. The existence of a trade-off between
As Worrall and Butler (1985) document, such wages and workers' compensation consequently
supplementary benefits are a significant source of hinges on the existence of some risk that state 2
income support. While the level of such benefits will prevail.
In a situation in which the tax rate is zero and
affects the welfare of workers, there is no loss in
generality in excluding them from the analysis by there is workers' compensation insurance available
incorporating them into U2(x), provided that the on an actuarially fair basis, from Viscusi (1979) we
assumptions above are satisfied. Unlike workers' have the result that income will be allocated across
compensation, social security benefits are not merit the two states so that U,l equals Ux2.In this perfect
rated to any degree so that there is no trade-off markets case, equation (2) reduces to
between wages and benefits within the particular
-p
dw_
job contract. The benefit value does, however,
I-p
dw2
have an indirect effect by raising the level of
U2(x) and possibly altering its shape. The analy- For the workers in the sample considered below,
sis below addresses the worker's welfare net of any and using the lost workday case injury rate as the
such influences. Viewed somewhat differently, it value of p, this condition implies a trade-off of
addresses the adequacy of workers' compensation - 0.04. In effect, workers will sacrifice 4 cents of
benefits, given the existence of these other social compensation (i.e., wages, fringes, etc.) when
healthy for an additional 1 dollar in compensation
insurance programs.5
To facilitate the conceptual analysis, assume all when injured (i.e., workers' compensation) if there
disabilities are temporary and total. Unlike earlier are no taxes and if insurance is available on an
analyses of workers' compensation, this model actuarially fair basis.
The manner in which these relationships are
and the subsequent empirical analysis explicitly
altered
under the existing compensation system
recognize its favorable tax status. There is a procan
be
ascertained
by assuming that the governportional tax rate t on wages w1. We assume that
the compensation system
has
ment
structured
the role of assets in affecting consumption is subdeviations
from these condioptimally.
Observed
sumed in the functional form of the utility functo
can
then
be
used
determine
whether comtions
tions, so that consumption levels in states 1 and 2
if not, how
levels
are
pensation
appropriate
and,
are (1 - t)w1 and w2.
from
the
amount.
differ
they
optimal
The focus here is on the rate of substitution
In addition to the presence of tax rates, actual
between wages and workers' compensation for a
insurance schemes have associated adminsocial
worker at a job with risk p. Analytically, the
costs so that under standard loading proistrative
initial part of the development follows Diamond
cedures
with
imperfect markets the schemes are
(1977) and Viscusi (1980). The worker's expected
not
actuarially
fair. Suppose that the degree of
utility is given by
insurance loading is such that for each dollar of
= G. (1)
- t)w1) + pU2(w2)
(1 -p)U1((l
expected compensation in state 2 the insured
The rate of trade-off between wages and workers' worker must sacrifice 1 + a dollars of compensacompensation that maintains the worker's level of tion in state 1. Furthermore, the worker must
break even on an actuarial basis given this degree
welfare is
of loading. The total limit on expected reimburse-aG/aW2
dw,
ment, including the administrative costs of insurance, is the worker's marginal product, z. For a
dw2
(1-p)(1-t)Ux?
aG/Iw1
(2) competitive firm, the marginal worker's marginal
product equals his expected wages and workers'
S This discussion addresses a homogeneous class of injuries.
compensation benefits plus an additional fee,
If social security benefits vary by injury severity, the net effect
apw2, to cover the administrative costs of all
is to raise the level of U2(x) for these more heavily comwhether
benefits received. The actuarial constraint is conpensated injuries. The empirical analysis will address
there is any remaining benefits gap, where in effect the higher
sequently
social security benefits can be viewed as making classes of
+ (1 + a)pw2-z = 0.
(3)
injuries less severe.
(1-p)w,
U2(x).

_

___x_
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ing).7 The average value of dwl/dw2 for both the
risk level in our sample and for the typical manufacturing worker will consequently be -0.05.
should be willing to trade off 5 cents of
Workers
- t)w1) + pU2(w2)
Max V = (1 -p)U1((l
additional dollar of workers' compensaper
wages
X
W2,
WI,
benefits.
tion
+
(1
+
a)pw2
-A[(1 -p)w,
zi,
If the level of workers' compensation benefits is
which yields
suboptimal, as a variety of observers have suggested, then the observed rate of trade-off should
A(1- t) Uxl = Ux2/(l + a),
exceed 5 cents per dollar. Similarly, if benefit
or
levels are excessive, then the observed trade-off of
+ a) xl.
(4) wages that workers are willing to sacrifice for
Ux2= 1t(
more workers' compensation will be below this
The presence of taxes and deviations from actuIn the subsequent empirical analysis we
level.
arially fair rates lead to optimal levels of insurance
how estimated rates of compensation
ascertain
that do not equate the marginal utility of income
compare with the reference point prosubstitution
in two health states unless (1 - t)(1 + a) equals
(5).
equation
by
vided
one. An appropriate combination of tax rates and
however, that these tests for
noted,
be
should
It
insurance loading could produce this outcome. If
to the private valuation by
only
pertain
(1 - t)(I + a) exceeds one, as when tax rates are optimality
The
does not address the role
worker.
analysis
the
low and the degree of insurance loading is high,
the
external
altruistic concern of
of
his
of
neglect
then the optimal marginal utility of consumption
making his job
when
in
welfare
his
own
society
in state 2 will be greater than in state 1. To
to be too
found
are
benefits
If,
however,
choice.
produce this higher marginal utility in state 2 one
will
interests
of
these
altruistic
consideration
low,
must decrease the level of consumption in state 2.
the
result.
reinforce
simply
This result is expected since shifting resources to
A factor that works in the opposite direction is
state 2 is more costly in the presence of taxes and
of the adverse incentives or moral hazard
that
actuarially unfair insurance rates, leading to a
associated with insurance. If workers'
problems
lower level of state 2 consumption and a higher
leads workers to be less careful in
compensation
associated marginal utility. Similarly, if (1 - t)
then the efficient level of inaccidents,
avoiding
(1 + a) is below 1, Ux' will exceed Ux2.
will
lower.
As a result, observing that
be
surance
The principal issue considered here is how, given
from the standpoint of
is
inadequate
insurance
optimal workers' compensation benefit conditions
insurance needs might
financial
workers'
meeting
as characterized by equation (4), the trade-off
that
the outcome is ineffiimply
necessarily
not
between compensation in the two states is affected.
moral hazard probif
there
is
a
significant
cient
Substituting the value of Ux2 from equation (4)
observed
excess of the
of
an
causes
lem.
Other
into equation (2), we have
estimated rate over our optimal rate include the
-p (l + a )
option value of risky jobs (Viscusi, 1979) and the
t)(I + a )Ux'
-p( (dw,
value of leisure during injury-induced layoffs.
i -p
- t)UX
dw2
(1 -p)(1

The optimal insurance scheme is obtained by
maximizing the worker's expected utility subject
to equation (3), or

(5)

With current levels of insurance loading, beneficiaries receive approximately 80 cents of each
dollar of insurance premiums, according to calculations based on the net earned premium valuation method in Burton and Krueger (forthcom6 This result is derived in Viscusi (1979), who also cites
related formulations in the medical insurance literature. It
should be noted that this result only pertains to earnings
replacement. Medical expenditures that may enhance the
chance of returning to good health are an entirely different
issue.

III. EmpiricalFormulationand
Sample Characteristics
The Data Base
The data used to estimate the model are drawn
from the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey
(QES) in which respondents were asked about
7 Although their paper focuses on 1983, similar calculations
by Burton for other years suggest that the ratio of losses
incurred to the net cost to policy holders has been in the 0.80
range in recent years.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
their 1976 employment experiences.8 The subsample that we examine contains 485 observations,
consisting of non-farm heads of households who
were not self-employed and who worked at least
twenty hours a week in the year of the survey. The
1977 QES and its two antecedents (e.g., the
1969-70 Survey of Working Conditions) are
unique in the variety of individual-specific information provided about working conditions. It is
also possible to match objective measures of
workplace hazards to sample members based on
their industry and to assign workers' compensation benefit levels to workers based on their state
of residence. Finally, unlike its earlier counterparts, the 1972-73 QES and the 1969-70 Survey
of Working Conditions, the hourly wage can be
calculated in the 1977 QES. Thus, estimates of
compensating wage differentials are not confounded by hours effects.
The two central variables in this study are the
job risk and workers' compensation variables. We
capture the health and safety risks to which the
worker is exposed in three different ways. First,
the survey includes subjective, individual-specific
responses to a series of questions concerning exposure to job hazards. If a worker cited any health
and safety risks of his job, the binary DANGER
variable assumes a value of 1. The remaining two
risk variables are based on the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (1979) data on industrial injuries
and illnesses, which are matched to workers by
three-digit industry code. These two variables are
RISKLW and RISKTR, and they represent the
rates of lost workday cases and total recordJed
cases of injury and illness per 100 workers, respectively. It has long been observed that each of these
measures is potentially affected by errors-in-variables bias. The paper by Moore and Viscusi (1985)
explores this problem, however, and finds no evidence of a statistically significant measurement
error bias, or evidence of endogeneity of the risk
variable.
The second variable of interest is the measure of
workers' compensation benefits. The measure we
constructed took into account not only the favorable tax status of workers' compensation benefits
but also the manner in which the benefit formulas
8 There were major changes in the workers' compensation
benefit formulas in the 1970s so that, to the extent that there is
a lag in the wage adjustment, the full equilibrium effects of the
revisions may not be apparent. The results consequently may
understate the equilibrium wage response to higher benefits.
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pertained to the particular individual rathel than
to the average worker. This is especially important
because benefit caps lead to a lower replacement
rate for more affluent workers, while benefit floors
can dramatically increase replacement rates for
low wage workers. To appreciate the difference
between replacement rates estimated for average
workers and those used here, one need only consider the ranges of rates derived in both cases. If
the replacement rate across states is analyzed for
the average workers in the sample, one finds that
it varies between about 40% and 105%, while at
the individual level the replacement rate goes from
18% to as high as 200%. It is also noteworthy that
the mean replacement rate across all individuals in
the sample increases from 0.55 to 0.83 when taxes
are considered.
The worker-specific replacement rates including
recognition of tax factors differ from those in the
literature in differing degrees. Dorsey and Walzer
(1983) use an industry and state-specific rate based
on insurance premiums that is then matched to
workers using Census industry codes. Butler (1983)
uses two measures, each at the industry level. The
first is actual benefits paid for death, temporary
total disability, and other injury categories that
are included as regressors in a pooled time seriescross section regression of industry average wages
on human capital, injury and death rates, actual
benefits, and other variables. His second measure
is the industry average replacement rate for each
year, which corresponds more closely to expected
benefits and is consequently better suited to the
theoretical model. Arnould and Nichols (1983) use
state gross replacement rates from the Comon Workmen 's Compensation
pendium
(Rosenblum,1973) matched to workers in the 1970
census 1/10,000 sample. Finally, Ruser (1985)
uses an individual-specific measure similar to ours,
but he does not include the effect of tax status on
the replacement rate.
Each of these measures yields mixed results.
Compensating differentials are often insignificant,
and sometimes wrong-signed. Likewise, the
workers' compensation effects are usually weak.
Dorsey and Walzer, in fact, find a positive relationship between wages and workers' compensation in the union portion of their sample. This
finding is not replicated by Ruser. Note also that
insurance premiums should be positively related
to accident rates and are less likely to reflect the
negative effect of ex ante insurance on wages.
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Each of the previous studies attempts to identify an additive effect of workers' compensation
on wages, and in some instances an interactive
effect with job risks as well. In the purely additive
models, workers' compensation variables usually
have the expected negative signs, and are sometimes significant. The addition of higher-order
terms consistently results in a dilution of this
result. The interactive effects are usually negative,
but are seldom significantly different from zero.
This previous research, although suggestive, appears to suffer from two principal shortcomings.
First, as shown in section II above, workers' compensation affects wages only at positive risk levels,
thus making an interactive model theoretically
appropriate. Second, most of the aforementioned
studies measure individual insurance levels with
substantial error.
The replacement rate variable to be used in the
subsequent analysis-WORKCOMP-is
similar
to that used by Topel (1984) to measure unemployment insurance benefits. Unfortunately, there
is no- single benefits measure that is ideal. States
have often complex benefit formulas that provide
for lump sum benefits and benefits depending on
the duration of the disability. The waiting periods
for these benefits may vary, and there are differences in the benefit structure according to the
degree and type of disability, or whether a fatality
was involved.
The approach we adopted was to base our benefits variable on the benefit formulas for temporary total disability by state.9 This benefit category accounts for three-fourths of all claims and
one-fifth of all cash benefits.10 The formulas for
permanent total disability are almost identical,
except that the duration of these benefits is greater.
Similarly, the large claims category of permanent
partial disability benefits is positively correlated
with temporary total disability."1 Ideally, one
9 U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1976).
10 See Price (1984).
11These correlations are reported in unpublished work by
John Burton and Alan Krueger. Using a sample of 31 states,
Burton and Krueger have found that the logarithm of temporary total disability benefits has a correlation coefficient of
0.58 with the logarithm of permanent total disability benefits,
0.64 with the logarithm of fatality benefits, and 0.38 with
permanent partial benefits. Their research effort takes into
account benefit maximums, minimums, replacement rates, and
durations. In contrast, our measure abstracts from duration
but is otherwise an accurate measure of both temporary total
disability and permanent total disability.

might wish to obtain actuarial valuation of expected benefit levels by state, but such calculations are a substantial research task for which we
did not have access to the pertinent data. Because
of the positive correlation among benefit categories, we will use the temporary total benefit
formulas as a proxy for state differencesin workers'
compensation benefit levels.
Where it was appropriate to do so, we adjusted
the benefit levels using information on the survey
respondents' marital status and number of dependents, and entered the resulting benefit figure as
the numerator in the replacement ratio Ri:
b.
R

w(1
w
Wi

-

ti)

Since benefits are not taxed, the tax rate does not
appear in the numerator of the expression for Ri.
The denominator in Ri is the after-tax wage,
wi(I - ti), where wi is the weekly wage and ti the
marginal tax rate. We used the earnings, hours,
and weeks worked information in the QES to
calculate a wage variable. In computing the tax
rate, we assume that all workers took the standard
deduction, with the number of exemptions based
on the reported number of dependents."2
Unlike previous measures of workers' compensation replacement rates, the value of Ri is
individual-specific and includes the effects of taxes.
As a result, it more closely measures the actual
rate workers use in making their decisions. As
noted by Topel for the analogous unemployment
compensation situation, observable determinants
of wi and ti render Ri endogenous. To correct for
this endogeneity, we regress Ri on a vector of
characteristics (Zi) and state dummy variables."3
The variable WORKCOMP, which is the predicted value of RO,serves as the exogenous measure of the replacement ratio.
A detailed list of variable definitions appears in
table 1, and table 2 summarizes the means and
standard deviations. The dependent variable in
the subsequent analysis is the worker's hourly
wage (WAGE) or its natural logarithm. Each
equation also includes a set of variables pertaining
12
Tax rates are from Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
(1976a, b).
13
The variables Z, include the number of dependents, a
marital status dummy variable, and all exogenous variables in
the wage equation.
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TABLE1.-VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

WAGE
FEMALE
BLACK
HEALTH
EXPER
EDLT12
EDEQ12
EDSC
EDCP
MTAX
DANGER
RISKLW
RISKTR
WORKCOMP
FAST
NODEC
OVERT
SECURE
SIZE
SUPER
TRAIN
UNION
NEAST
SOUTH
NCENT
WEST
URBAN
PROF
MGR
SALES
CLERK
CRAFT
OPER
TRANS
UNSK
SER VE

Computed hourly after-tax wage measure.
Sex dummy variable (d.v.): 1 if female, 0 otherwise.
Race d.v.: 1 if worker is black, 0 otherwise.
Severity of health limitation d.v.: 1 if limiting physical or nervous condition has created either sizable or great
problems in working on or in getting jobs, 0 otherwise.
Experience variable: Years worked for pay since age 16.
Education d.v.: 1 if worker did not finish high school, 0 otherwise.
Education d.v.: 1 if worker finished high school, 0 otherwise.
Education d.v.: 1 if worker has some college education, 0 otherwise.
Education d.v.: 1 if worker has at least a college degree, 0 otherwise.
Marginal tax rate.
Hazardous working conditions d.v.: 1 if worker answered "yes" to "does your job at any time expose you to
what you feel are physical dangers or unhealthy conditions," 0 otherwise.
BLS industry hazard variable: annual rate of injuries and illnesses involving lost workdays.
BLS industry hazard variable: total annual rate of injuries and illnesses.
Workers' compensation replacement rate: Benefit level/(WAGE(l - MTAX)).
Work pace d.v.: 1 if job requires worker to work very fast a lot, 0 otherwise.
Absence of worker decisions on job d.v.: 1 if it is not at all true that the worker makes a lot of decisions
on the job, 0 otherwise.
Overtime work d.v.: 1 if worker works overtime often, 0 otherwise.
Job security d.v.: 1 if it is very true that the worker'sjob security is good: 0 otherwise.
Firm size: Midpoints assigned to intervals for number of workers at the firm (hundreds of workers).
Super d.v.: 1 if worker supervises anyone as part of his job, 0 otherwise.
Training program d.v.: 1 if employer makes available a training program to improve worker skills, 0 otherwise.
Union status d.v.: 1 if worker belongs to a union or employee's association, 0 otherwise.
Northeast region d.v.: 1 if worker lives in northeastern United States, 0 otherwise.
Southern region d.v.: 1 if worker lives in southeastern U.S., 0 otherwise.
North Central region d.v.: 1 if worker lives in north central U.S., 0 otherwise.
Western region d.v.: 1 if worker lives in western U.S., 0 otherwise.
Urban area d.v.: 1 if worker lives in a major SMSA, 0 otherwise.
Professional and technical d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as professional or technical, 0 otherwise.
Manager and administratord.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as manager or administrator, 0 otherwise.
Sales d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as sales, 0 otherwise.
Clerical d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as clerical, 0 otherwise.
Craftsmen and foremen d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as craftsman or foreman, 0 otherwise.
Operative d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as non-transport operative, 0 otherwise.
Transport operative d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as transport equipment operative, 0 otherwise.
Unskilled d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as unskilled laborer, 0 otherwise.
Service d.v.: 1 if worker reports occupation as private household services, 0 otherwise.

to the worker's personal characteristics, such as
the worker's sex (FEMALE dummy variabled.v.), race (BLACK d.v.), presence of health impairments (HEALTH d.v.), years of work experience since the age of 16 (EXPER), and whether
the worker has less than 12 years of schooling
(EDLT12 d.v.), exactly 12 years (EDEQ1I d.v),
some college (EDSC d.v.), or has completed at
least a college degree (EDCP d.v.).
Pertinent job characteristicsinclude the worker's
marginal tax rate (MTAX), which was used in
constructing the WORKCOMP variable, the subjective risk assessment variable (DANGER d.v.),
the lost workday accident rate (RISKLW), the
total recorded injury and illness rate (RISKTR),
the predicted value of the workers' compensation
replacement rate ( WORKCOMP), whether the job
requires the worker to work fast (FAST d.v.),
whether the job permits the worker to make deci-

sions (NODEC d.v), whether the worker works
overtime often (OVERT d.v.), whether the worker
has good job security (SECURE d.v.), the number of employees at the workplace (SIZE), whether the worker is a supervisor (SUPER d.v.),
whether the employer offers a training program
(TRAIN d.v.), and whether the worker is a union
member (UNION d.v.). Occupation dummy variables (PROF, MGR, SALES, CLERK, CRAFT,
OPER, TRANS, UNSK, SERVE) were entered
to control for unobservable occupation-specific
characteristics. The particular set of nonpecuniary
rewards variables that was selected closely followed the group utilized in the earnings equations
for the earlier Survey of Working Conditions results reported in Viscusi (1978).
Finally, we included a set of regional dummy
variables for whether the respondent lived in the
Northeast (NEAST d.v.), in the South (SOUTH
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TABLE 2.-SAMPLE
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MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

(N = 485)
Variable

Means

Standard
Deviation

WAGE
FEMALE
BLA CK
HEALTH
EXPER
EDLT12
EDEQ12
EDSC
EDCP
MTA X
DANGER
RISKLW
RISKTR
WORKCOMP
FAST
NODEC
OVERT
SECURE
SIZE
SUPER
TRAIN
UNION
NEAST
SOUTH
NCENT
WEST
URBAN
PROF
MGR
SALES
CLERK
CRAFT
OPER
TRANS
UNSK
SER VE

7.676
0.162
0.068
0.029
20.901
0.191
0.351
0.226
0.232
0.264
0.798
3.810
9.738
0.835
0.162
0.016
0.347
0.427
6.698
0.351
0.511
0.341
0.200
0.284
0.337
0.179
0.259
0.216
0.136
0.047
0.092
0.219
0.127
0.062
0.046
0.055

3.779
0.369
0.252
0.167
12.078
0.393
0.477
0.419
0.423
0.095
0.402
2.418
5.627
0.315
0.369
0.127
0.477
0.495
10.265
0.478
0.500
0.474
0.400
0.451
0.473
0.384
0.438
0.412
0.343
0.212
0.290
0.414
0.334
0.241
0.209
0.229

d.v.), in the North Central (NCENT d.v.), in the
West (WEST d.v.), and in an urban area (URBAN
d.v.). Detailed industry and occupation responses
for each worker also made it possible to create
pertinent job-related dummy variables and to
merge the BLS risk data with the sample information at the three-digit industry level."4Overall, the
sample was broadly representative of the working
population.
The wage equations differ in three ways. First,
the functional form of the dependent variable,
which is theoretically arbitrary,is either WAGE or
ln WAGE. The second distinction among the regressions is in the nature of the job hazard measure. As described above, there are three of these,
14
In only a few cases was it necessary to use two-digit risk
measures.

DANGER, RISKLW, and RISKTR. Third, the
manner in which the WORKCOMP variable enters varies, partly for purposes of comparison with
previous research. We first omit WORKCOMP
from the regressions, then enter it separately to
provide a comparison with earlier research. Finally, the theoretically preferable interaction of
WORKCOMP with the RISK variables is included. Not reported below are results from regressions in which the WORKCOMP variable is
entered both interactively and additively. The additive term was never significant in any of these,
while the interactive term performed well.
For example, the three ln WAGE equations for
person i using RISKLWi as the hazard measure
are15

ln WAGEi = UkXik

+ yRISKLWI+

E,

(6)

k

ln WAGEi = U3kXik + yRISKLW
k

+ ?WORKCOMP,+ Ei

(7)

and

ln WAGE, = E/PkXik + yRISKLW,
k

+ 8RISKLW x WORKCOMP,
+Ee
(8)
Equation (6) corresponds to the usual hedonic
wage regression that fails to account for insurance.
Equation (7) is similar to those estimated by several
other investigators. In Arnould and Nichols (1983),
inclusion of the workers' compensation variable
boosted the value of the risk coefficient by 12%
and was associated with a statistically significant
wage reduction, as expected. These modest effects
may stem in part from their use of the death risk
as a proxy for compensable job-related injuries,
which is likely to be a less pertinent measure than
the lost workday risk. Dorsey and Walzer (1983)
adopted a similar formulation using BLS injury
rate data and found a substantial positive effect
on the job risk premium for nonunion workers
and a negative effect for union workers.16Another
approach that has appeared in papers by Ruser
15The variables Xk are EXPER, EXPER2, FEMALE,
BLA CK, HEALTH, UNION, education dummy variables,
FAST, NODEC, SECURE, SUPER, OVERT, TRAIN, SIZE,
URBAN, and region and occupation dummy variables.
16 In our exploratory runs to be reported in a future study on
unions we found an effect of workers' compensation for both
union and nonunion subsamples of the QES.
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(1985) and Butler (1983) is to include both a
separate workers' compensation variable and one
that has been interacted with the risk level, but
their results are usually not statistically significant
or have the wrong signs. It is worth noting that all
previous research has omitted other workplace
characteristics, a potential source of bias. Moreover, the individual-specific hazard variable
DANGER has heretofore not been used in a study
including workers' compensation.

TABLE3.-ESTIMATESOFIn WAGE EQUATIONS
(t-ratios in parentheses)a
Independent
Variable
FEMALE
BLACK
HEALTH
EXPER
EXPERSQ

IV.

Compensating Differential Estimates

The focus of our empirical analysis is on a series
of equations including different combinations of
risk and workers' compensation variables. The
basic structure of the wage equation is, however,
unchanged. In table 3 we report detailed estimates
for a representative In WAGE equation with the
RISKLW variable and the interaction of this risk
variable with WORKCOMP. This specification is
the most important, since it is the lost workday
accident rate and its interaction with the workers'
compensation variable that best reflect the impact
of the workers' compensation system.
Overall, the equation and its WAGE equation
counterpart perform in the expected manner. There
is a positive but diminishing effect of work experience on earnings. Workers in the college-educated
group tend to earn more income, as do union
members. Moreover, the performance of the explanatory variables such as union status is quite
robust with respect to specification of the risk
variables.
The focus of the analysis is on the various risk
and workers' compensation measures. Results for
the different combinations of risk and compensation variables utilized appear in table 4. In each
case we first included a risk variable by itself, then
with the interaction with the workers' compensation variable, and finally with a workers' compensation variable not interacted with the risk.
Although we estimated eighteen equations in all,
the principal patterns of influence were common
across all of these variants. In 10 of 12 cases,
inclusion of the workers' compensation variable
boosted the statistical significance of the risk variable alone. Inclusion of workers' compensation
(not interacted with job risk) had little effect on
the risk variable coefficient. This was not the case
for the interactive regressions 2, 5, and 8. Finally,
the workers' compensation variable was con-

EDLT12
EDSC
EDCP
RISKLW
RISKL W X WORKCOMP
FAST
NODEC
OVERT
SECURE
SIZE
SUPER
TRAIN
UNION
NCENT
SOUTH
WEST
URBAN
PROF
MGR
SALES
CLERK
CRAFT
OPER
TRANS
SERVE
R2

Coefficient
(t-ratio)
-0.230
(-4.545)
-0.124
(- 1.834)
-0.210
(-2.156)
0.031
(5.576)
-0.001
(-4.773)
-0.098
(-2.028)
-0.018
(-0.394)
0.185
(3.314)
0.041
(2.946)
-0.031
(-2.079)
-0.068
(-1.549)
0.140
(1.092)
-0.042
(- 1.208)
0.085
(2.564)
0.007
(3.931)
0.069
(1.761)
0.049
(1.353)
0.160
(4.218)
0.036
(0.761)
-0.013
(- 0.275)
0.142
(2.614)
0.182
(4.599)
0.210
(2.132)
0.236
(2.375)
0.201
(1.780)
0.028
(0.283)
0.096
(1.073)
0.008
(0.094)
0.005
(-0.052)
-0.290
(-2.704)
0.477

a Critical
t-values are 1.64 (5% confidence level), and 1.96 (1% level) for
one-tailed tests.
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(t-ratios in parentheses)a
COEFFICIENTS
TABLE 4.-SUMMARY OF RISK AND WORKERS'COMPENSATION

Independent
Variable

1

2

3

4

Equation Number
5
6

9

7

8

-

-

-

-

-

-

WAGE Equations
RISKLW
RISKTR

0.099
(1.528)
-

DANGER

-

RISKLW X
WORKCOMP
RISKTR X
WORKCOMP
DANGERX
WORKCOMP
WORKCOMP

-

R2

0.282
(2.319)

0.101
(1.599)

0.037
(1.310)

0.113
(2.249)

0.038
(1.353)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.610
(-1.083)
0.371

-

-0.999
(-1.534)
-

0.372

-

-

-0.230
(1.777)

-

-

-

-

-0.096
(-1.828)
-

-

-

-0.606
(-1.075)
0.372

-

-

-

0.374

0.374

0.017
(2.214)
-

0.041
(2.946)

0.373

0.411

0.270
(0.715)

1.057
(1.659)

0.371

0.252
(0.660)

-0.560
(-0.993)
0.369

In WAGE Equations
RISKLW
RISKTR

0.017
(2.256)

-

-

0.007
(2.017)

0.018
(2.945)

-

-

0.007
(2.064)
0.029
(0.651)

0.148
(2.008)

0.026
(0.596)

DANGER

-

-

-

-

-

-

RISKLW X
WORKCOMP
RISKTRX
WORKCOMP
DANGER X
WORKCOMP
WORKCOMP

-

-0.031
(-2.079)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.012
(-2.188)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.080
(-1.225)
0.474

-

-

-0.081
(-1.241)
0.473

-

-0.153
(-2.013)
-

R2
a

0.479

0.477

0.478

0.477

0.474

0.472

-0.074
(-1.212)
0.469

Critical t-values are 1.65 (5% confidence level) and 1.96 (1% level) for one-tailed tests.

These estimates, however, do not take into
account the depressing influence that workers'
compensation has on the level of risk premiums. If
The Implicit Value of Job Injuries
workers' compensation benefits dropped to zero,
Although addition of the interactive WORK- the required wage premium would rise substanCOMP variable greatly boosts the coefficient on tially because of the income risks workers would
the job risk variable, after taking into account the face. One measure of this increase is the increased
role of both the risk and the interaction term there implicit value of a job injury, which would rise to
is not a large difference in the implicit value of job $96,000 for the wage equation and to $112,000 for
injuries when evaluated at current workers' com- its log wage counterpart. Similarly, full earnings
of inpensation levels. The implicit value of a lost work- replacement would lead to implicit values
$26,000
and
equation
wage
for
the
of
$17,000
juries
day accident remains at $43,000 for the ln WAGE
equation and rises from $32,000 to $36,000 for the for the semilogarithmic form.
Although extrapolations of this nature are not
WAGE equation upon inclusion of the interaction
reliable as are estimates pertaining to current
as
term."7 Each of these is consistent with past estiof compensation, the overall spirit of the
levels
mates of the implicit value of injuries, as found in
is clear. If there were no program providing
results
Viscusi (1979, 1983).
earnings replacement to injured workers, the level
17 All estimates are in 1984 dollars.
of risk premiums would increase greatly. The re-

sistently negative and statistically significant in the
interacted version.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
duction in risk premiums from additional increases in workers' compensation is much more
modest.
The results for the full compensation case are of
interest in their own right since they isolate the
earnings risk from the health status risk associated
with job injuries. The findings here imply that at
least half of current implicit valuations of injuries
represent implicit values of the nonmonetary
aspects of injuries. In effect, the $17,000 and
$26,000 estimates presented above represent the
value of the nonmonetary health losses associated
with accidents.
These results are the first estimates of nonpecuniary health impacts that have ever been obtained. These valuations pertain both to the value
of pain and suffering and the more general welfare
losses from what Burton (1983) has termed "nonwork disability." To the extent that analysts wish
to place a value on these nonmonetary considerations for policy evaluation or in a judicial proceeding, these empirical estimates provide a beginning for the process of trying to assess these
amounts, which in the past have been based entirely on speculation. At current compensation
levels, about half of the compensation for injuries
is for nonpecuniary consequences. If, however,
there were no income replacement program, the
relative importance of the health aspects would be
far less.

Are Benefits Levels Optimal?
The fundamental and more immediate policy
concern to which this paper is addressed is whether
there is an adequate level of earnings replacement
under the workers' compensation system. The results most pertinent to an assessment of the rate
of substitution between wages and workers' compensation are in column 2 of table 4, which includes both RISKLW and the interaction of this
variable with WORKCOMP. The lost workday
accident rate is the risk variable that most closely
corresponds to the probability of receiving
workers' compensation benefits for temporary total
disability or permanent total disability. Similarly,
WORKCOMP is the appropriate measure of insurance.
The interaction term approach to assessing the
role of workers' compensation is preferable be-
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cause the expected value of workers' compensation coverage hinges on the risk level. Workers in
completely safe jobs receive no benefits from the
existence of such a compensation scheme. The
expected benefits are the products of the risk level
and benefits level, where in this case we use the
replacement rate as the benefit variable. The interaction variable appears in columns 2, 5, and 8 of
table 4.
The rate of substitution between wages and
workers' compensation implied by these equations
is quite substantial. Based on the empirical results,
one can calculate how changes in the benefit formula affect the wage level. For both the WAGE
and ln WAGE equations an additional 1 dollar in
workers' compensation benefits leads to a 12 cent
reduction in wages. In each case, the rate of
substitution is more than twice the 5 cent per
dollar trade-off one would expect given current
rates of insurance loading and injury rates. Moreover, the 4 cent per dollar trade-off that would be
optimal with actuarially fair insurance is even
further below the observed trade-off rates.
Not only is there substitution between wages
and worker's compensation, but workers are willing to sacrifice more wages when healthy than
would be dictated by the added insurance costs.
Taken at face value, these results imply that existing levels of workers' compensation benefits are
suboptimal from the standpoint of insuring income levels. Such underprovision of benefits may
nevertheless be efficient if moral hazard is an
important concern. Recent evidence in Butler and
Worrall (1983) suggests that the elasticity of injuries with respect to the level of benefits may be
substantial. Their finding of a strong interstate
correlation of workers' compensation benefits and
reported injury rates is suggestive, but it has never
been resolved whether this result is a reporting
phenomenon or a reflection of an actual difference
in injury rates.
Several other implications of the results are also
noteworthy. First, we have calculated the benefit
levels necessary to provide full insurance to equate
the marginal utility when healthy and when injured and found that an increase of $111 from the
weekly average of $266 would achieve this result.
Second, and finally, it is not possible to calculate
the benefit level necessary to reach the desired
wage trade-off of 5 cents per dollar of benefits.
This requires information on preferences, which is
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not available from hedonic wage equations such as
we have estimated here.
V. Conclusion
The workers' compensation variable proved to
be of fundamental importance in analyzing the
structure of job risk compensation for workers in
the Quality of Employment Survey. Higher levels
of workers' compensation lead to a reduction in
the base wage level that workers are paid. In addition, the size of the estimated risk-wage tradeoff is enhanced by inclusion of a workers' compensation variable, thus strengthening findings in
the compensating differential literature. Overall,
the strongest results were those for which the
workers' compensation variable interacted with
the job risk measure, as should be expected.
Two of the implications of the results extend to
concerns of a much broader nature. First, the
observed rate at which workers are willing to trade
off base wage rates for higher levels of workers'
compensation greatly exceeds the actuarial rate of
trade-off, even taking into account administrative
costs. These results suggest that benefit levels in
1976 were suboptimal, provided that one abstracts
from moral hazard considerations.
Finally, the results suggest that a large portion
of compensating differentials for job hazards is for
the nonmonetary aspects of the potential loss.
However, if there were no workers' compensation
system the role of income losses would predominate. The estimate that job hazards have an
associated health impact of $17,000 to $26,000 is
the first estimate of the role of the nonmonetary
costs of job risks. In this case it is clear that
welfare implications of job risks extend well bevond their financial implications.
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